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Taking Stock of EU Energy Policy: Progress, Problems, and Prospects 
 
Vicki L. Birchfield and John S. Duffield 
 
Energy has become an issue of integration and disintegration of the EU and 
perhaps will turn out to be the ultimate litmus test of political and economic unity 
in the EU.   
Jacques de Jong and Coby van der Linde (2008) 
 
This volume has brought together a broad range of expertise in energy policy and 
European integration to assess the current state of one of the most complex policy 
challenges facing the European Union today.  European energy policy is a vexing subject 
to understand comprehensively due in part to its relatively nascent state, but also because 
of the multifaceted objectives and policy priorities. These include energy security, 
efficiency and economic competitiveness, and environmental sustainability, all of which 
encompass or impinge upon various dimensions of both the internal and external affairs 
of the European Union.  The goals of this concluding chapter are to summarize briefly 
the key insights and findings of the individual chapters, to evaluate how much 
progress has actually been made toward the achievement of a common EU energy 
policy, and to identify the main problems that might hinder its further development.   
Synthesizing the analyses of the preceding chapters, we also seek to offer an overall 
assessment of why progress has been more substantial in some areas than in others 
and what the implications of this uneven development are for moving towards a 
truly coherent and effective common energy policy in Europe. 
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A. The Context 
As acknowledged throughout this volume, energy in some ways has been at 
the heart of the European integration project from its very inception in the form of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), which fostered economic and 
technical cooperation through the pooling and collective regulation of these two 
basic resources essential to the reconstruction of Europe after the destruction of 
World War Two.   That a supranational authority was first put into action as early as 
the 1950s to monitor production and prices in the critical and strategic area of 
energy belies the reality that it took nearly six decades before a more 
comprehensive EU energy policy would begin to crystallize.  Despite the creation of 
Euratom with the Rome Treaty of 1957 and subsequent attempts to mount a 
Community level approach to energy, sustained movement toward a common 
energy policy began only with the adoption in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the 
agenda to complete the internal market, as contained in the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.  Deepening integration was intended to 
increase efficiency in sectors that had been largely under national control, which 
still included most aspects of energy policy.   
Earlier efforts to develop a common energy policy had mostly failed due to 
the diverse mixes of energy in member states and the range of national interests 
invested in them.  In the 1990s, EU energy policy discussions were predicated on the 
twin assumptions that energy markets would remain or become ever more 
globalized and that a market oriented approach with Russia and other energy-
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producing former Soviet bloc countries would be successful. Both of these 
assumptions turned out to be problematic.  Instead, the attempted European Energy 
Charter and its associated treaty were frustrated by Russia’s refusal to ratify, and 
the focus on an internal market strategy became increasingly problematic, as 
volatility in international energy markets resulted in a shift from a buyer’s to a 
seller’s market.  Thus, rather than being driven by companies and market forces, 
energy policy discussions became increasingly dominated by national political 
interests (de Jong and van der Linde 2008, 2-3.)  Global energy demand rose rapidly,  
particularly with the accelerated growth of emerging economies in China and India, 
while production capacity struggled to keep up.  The lack of expected liberalization 
in Russia’s gas markets also caused problems, as did the divergence of views within 
the EU regarding a strategic relationship with Russia (see Grätz, this volume).   
Furthermore, political instability in other supplier countries contributed to rising 
prices and fears about supply disruptions. 
As a result of these developments, , national political concerns appeared to 
be trumping globalizing economic and European regional interests.  Relations with 
Russia have become central in the EU’s quest for a common energy policy, 
particularly given the recent membership of former communist countries with 
lingering fears towards Russia and greater exposure to security of supply concerns.  
Furthermore, many of these newer member states did not have the benefit of 
liberalizing their markets when supplies seemed abundant and prices were lower.  
Crisis management has arisen as another important issue to be addressed, along 
with external relations with supplier and transport countries, but it is exceedingly 
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difficult to arrive at a consensus in these areas.   As many of the preceding chapters 
have elucidated, the EU is poorly equipped to play the usual governmental regulator 
role in energy, since it is not a state itself with a direct and decisive capacity to act 
and the member states that comprise it have such divergent interests and varying 
import dependencies.   
 Thus it has become increasingly evident that viewing energy policy primarily 
as an internal market issue is no longer adequate.  Political concerns have moved to 
the forefront, with the tighter global market, the politicization of energy issues, and 
growing fears over security of supply taking precedence.  And, it is precisely 
member states’ varying levels of exposure to supply issues, differing energy mixes, 
and divergent views towards external relations (particularly with Russia) that make 
this critical policy area one for which it is ever difficult to reach consensus among 27 
member states.  Furthermore, the challenge of addressing all aspects of energy in 
one coherent policy – of combining environmental concerns with security of supply 
issues and internal market goals – is proving to be exceptionally difficult.  The 
imperative to create an energy policy for the whole of the EU in the face of such 
obstacles has resulted in what Jacques de Jong and Coby van der Linde have aptly 
described as a “litmus test of economic and political integration in the EU” (2008, 3).   
Bearing this in mind, we now offer a brief overview of the key insights of the various 
chapters in this volume to gauge the status of such a litmus test at this point in EU 
energy policy development. 
B. EU Energy Policies: Progress and Problems  
 348 
The chapters in section one of the book examine recent developments in six 
key policy areas: market liberalization, external energy policy, EU energy relations 
with Russia, emissions trading, renewable energy, and energy efficiency.  Each 
chapter seeks to identify the key proposals and actions taken by the EU and member 
states and to explain why such particular policies were proposed and what 
considerations motivated EU bodies and member states in both furthering and/or  
impeding the creation of a common policy in the specific area of concern.  The 
chapters may loosely be grouped according to whether the specific areas analyzed 
deal with the internal or the external dimensions of the EU policy efforts.  Emissions 
trading, renewable energy, efficiency, and market liberalization all fall under the 
general guise of the EU’s internal policies, whereas relations with Russia and 
external energy policy issues such as security of supply are more bound up with the 
EU’s foreign policies and external relations. 
One common theme among the disparate chapters in this volume, however, 
is that this bifurcation of internal versus external policies is a considerable 
hindrance to the development of a more coherent energy policy.  Many of the 
contributing authors have observed that this rigid conception and binary 
classification of internal versus external policy is actually quite misleading.  Richard 
Youngs provides an explicit example of why this distinction is a rather dubious one: 
EU competition laws condition foreign policy positions. For example, 
they have required non-EU oil producing countries to drop traditional 
‘destination clauses’, through which they traditionally prevented a 
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buyer passing on surplus supplies to other states. Removing such 
provisions undermines the exclusivity of bilateral contracts. Supplies 
are better able to flow to where they are needed within the European 
Union. And national EU governments gain leverage over producer 
states. Europeanised internal rules are what provide foreign policy 
leverage and unity. European policy-makers have readily 
acknowledged that completing the internal market in energy is 
necessary for external influence and unity. The rules and 
regulations of the internal market are defined as the key 
foundation to the EU’s international projection in energy 
matters. (Emphasis added. See Youngs page X, this volume.) 
 
Nonetheless, as Youngs’ analysis reveals, there is still a considerable degree 
of political maneuvering as member states pursue bilateral strategies that 
ultimately undermine the more “communautaire” approach.  This problem is also 
pinpointed by Grätz in his chapter on the EU’s relations with Russia.  The challenge 
of a common energy policy towards Russia has been aggravated by the 
fundamentally different perceptions of and widely divergent foreign policies 
towards Russia held by the member states. Whereas the Commission and a few 
smaller and new member states from Central and Eastern Europe have been wary of 
relying heavily on Russia to meet their energy needs, some older member states 
such as Germany have preferred instead to endow energy policy with the broader 
goal of binding Russia closer to Europe by integrating their respective energy 
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sectors.   Thus it would appear that the external dimensions of the EU’s energy 
policy will continue to pose the most difficulty with respect to forging a more 
coherent and unified position with Russia and also with other suppliers and third 
countries.  
Ironically, even in areas where specific policies appear to be clearly within the 
internal domain of EU policymaking, the external dimension is often directly implicated. 
We see this, for example, in Jørgen Wettestad’s examination of the development of the 
EU Emissions and Trading System (ETS). While he acknowledges that insufficient time 
has passed to effectively and comprehensively evaluate this program, he does take stock 
of some preliminary progress and challenges.  Among the achievements of the ETS, 
Wettestad points to the development of an unprecedented international marketplace for 
carbon emissions trading, the growth of important infrastructure to support and regulate 
the ETS, and the beginnings of change in the mindset of corporate leaders in regards to 
climate change issues.  He also acknowledges several criticisms of the ETS, however, 
including charges of too many allowances in the initial stages, wide fluctuations in price, 
internal market anomalies benefiting energy producers, and external market anomalies 
involving carbon leakage. Overall, Wettestad assigns a 'mixed performance' to the ETS, 
citing the reservations and mixed reviews of non-state actors as well as member states 
and EU institutions.  For the future, Wettestad sees prospects for a much more centralized 
ETS with tighter caps, less flexibility for member states, and more auctioning.  
Importantly, he also notes that the ETS came about not only as a direct response to 
climate change, but also in an effort to influence and encourage climate change action on 
the international level.  Thus, once again we see how EU internal policies are often 
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motivated by external as well as internal factors and not easily interpreted or explained by 
a single theoretical framework, a point that was also made by Birchfield in her overview 
of EU institutions and policy making. 
In an adjacent policy area, Jørgen Henningsen tackles issues related to energy 
efficiency.  He argues that while there have been much many opportunities in this area – 
what he terms “low-hanging fruit,” especially with the entrance of new member states, 
and in spite of the fact that energy efficiency has been given a prominent place in the 20-
20-20 scheme, there has been in fact little progress thus far, and energy efficiency has 
remained a secondary priority.  This is the case, Henningsen asserts, because the EU has 
found it much easier to identify energy efficiency potential than to prescribe measures to 
improve it, as seen in the 2005 Green Paper on Energy Efficiency and the 2006 Energy 
Efficiency Action Plan, which merely restated previous measures or mentioned plans to 
review existing policies without advancing much of anything new.   The lack of progress 
stems partially from the difficulty in addressing an issue that spans literally nearly all 
sectors of society, from appliances, buildings, energy production, and transportation, to 
the ETS, and the very different energy usage within member states.  As a result of this 
enormous scope, a focused policy has been difficult to achieve and progress has been 
very limited.  Furthermore,  as Henningsen puts it,  energy efficiency lacks the ‘glamour’ 
of other priorities, such as renewables and security of supply.  Henningsen does regard 
progress as likely in the future, although he predicts that the same problems will persist 
and that many of the energy efficiency “low-hanging fruit” will remain to be picked due 
to the limitations of ETS, the lack of a legally binding efficiency target, and the greater 
sense of urgency surrounding other issues. 
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Similarly pessimistic, Måns Nilsson discusses the less than stellar development of 
renewable energy sources (RES) as well as the challenges and successes seen in attempts 
to promote a common RES policy on the European level.  He asserts that RES policy has 
long been an area of member state dominance, with several states developing successful 
programs such as tradeable renewable electricity certificates (TREC) and feed-in tariffs 
(FIT).  Not much progress has been made in harmonizing these efforts under the 
European umbrella, however, particularly before 2006, largely because of differences in 
member state interests.  Recently, though, due to growing concerns over security of 
supply and stronger links to climate change, which has become an increasingly important 
consideration in European energy policy, RES policy has seen movement on the 
European stage, with the setting of binding national target levels.  Nilsson asserts, 
however, that the EU is still far from having a real common RES policy.  Furthermore, he 
argues that the future of RES is highly dependent upon the evolution of institutional 
relationships and agendas within the EU and does not view a true common RES policy as 
a step likely to be taken soon. 
Underlying motivations for a more unified approach to energy policy at the 
European level is the implicit, but fundamental recognition that this sector is one 
that is inherently linked to the basic needs and welfare of society, yet also   
determinative of how competitive a domestic economy is.  When that domestic 
economy is enmeshed in a larger regional economy like the EU, it is imperative that 
the energy systems not operate in isolation, but rather that national markets be 
regionally coordinated to tap the full efficiency potential as well as to ensure 
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consumer choice and lower prices—both of which are purported benefits of 
economic integration.   
How has the EU fared in achieving the internal energy market ? Eikeland’s 
assessment is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the Commission has been 
aggressive in its three policy packages replete with various regulations and 
directives designed to create free and fair markets for electricity and gas.  On the 
other hand, the ultimate success of this legislation has been contingent on the 
proper transposition of these energy rules and regulations into the 27 national 
systems.  Eikeland’s study shows the gap between these two forces at work in EU 
policy making efforts.  The European Commission has repeatedly, and as recently as 
2009, had to initiate infringement procedures against many member states for 
deficiencies in their implementation of improperly implementing internal market 
provisions for both electricity and gas..   Despite these setbacks, he also reveals that 
the Commission’s benchmarking report for 2009 shows that most member states 
have finally transposed the legal provision guaranteeing all consumers the right to 
shift suppliers in the national electricity and gas markets, with just a few still lagging 
behind.  So, the pattern of very mixed success seems to prevail, even in an area where 
the Commission has exercised clearer competence.   A critical but often overlooked 
factor when assessing EU policy innovation is the extent to which member states actually 
follow through on the implementation front. It appears this will remain a key challenge in 
the area of energy policy.  
 
C.  National Perspectives: The Role of the Big Three 
 354 
 As we have seen, the sheer range of initiatives and the complexity of both the 
internal and external dimensions of energy policy make it difficult to offer definitive 
assessments of the EU’s relative success in achieving a common energy policy.  The 
picture becomes even more complicated once we begin addressing the specific positions 
and influence of the member states in either pushing a EU policy forward or inhibiting its 
further development.  In no way intending to discount the significance of other member 
states, this volume nonetheless focuses on the experience and perspectives of the three 
most influential member states: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.  Although 
some chapters touch on the role of other member states and underscore the diverse 
interests and policy prerogatives underlying various aspects of energy policy as it 
gradually moves upward to the European level, the prime movers and resisters have 
arguably been the largest and most powerful states.  Analyses like those presented by 
Sophie Meritet, Francis McGowan, and John Duffield and Kirsten Westphal sufficiently 
illustrate that energy policy formation at the EU level is still very much a member state 
driven enterprise, even though the intergovernmental restraints have been lessened with 
the Lisbon Treaty and the Commission has become increasingly proactive in promoting a 
common energy policy (Eikeland 2010). 
Meritet's chapter closely examines the challenges in aligning national energy 
policies with EU energy policy goals.  She provides a detailed account of the French 
situation, unique for its lack of natural fossil fuels, strong governmental role, 
longstanding movement towards energy independence, and emphasis on its nuclear 
program, and analyzes how the country navigates its relationship with EU energy policy. 
While France is a founding and powerful member of the EU with a significant voice in 
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EU policy, it has been considered a 'black sheep' in energy policy because of its unique 
situation, and thus it too has had to adjust its traditionally state-centric energy sector in 
order to comply with EU energy requirements and policy goals.  While this requirement 
has presented challenges for both France and the EU, Meritet sees much commonality in 
the overarching goals of member states.  All share a desire for environmental protection, 
reduced dependence on oil, the development of renewables to achieve diversity and 
security of supply with efficient market mechanisms, but national interests pose continual 
problems in achieving these EU level goals.  Meritet points to the widespread 
acknowledgement of the need for a common EU energy policy throughout Europe and 
the development of stronger European foreign policy as promising indicators of future 
progress in this area.  With these goals in mind, Meritet suggests that France itself may 
shift from a "black sheep" to a role model for future EU energy intensity, independence, 
and efficiency, if it can overcome its propensity towards heavy government intervention. 
Similar to Meritet’s chapter, McGowan highlights the uniqueness and specificity 
of the relationship of the United Kingdom with EU energy policy.  Like France, the 
United Kingdom viewed itself as an exceptional case initially when it came to energy 
issues - France because of its unusually high use of nuclear power and large government 
control of the energy sector, and Britain because of its unique position as a net fossil fuel 
exporter.  Over recent years, however, both countries have recognized the need for a 
stronger common European stance in this area, due to supply security concerns and 
increased awareness of climate change issues.   McGowan details the shift in the British 
case, focusing on the importance of market-based solutions in the UK.  Britain was 
initially hesitant, if not hostile, towards transferring authority to the EU in energy areas, 
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with the exception of market liberalization, which has traditionally been the area of EU 
integration most acceptable to Britain.  However, as the UK has shifted from an energy 
producer to an energy consumer and has become increasingly concerned with climate 
issues, the country has grown more open to the idea of European involvement and 
cooperation within the energy sector and more willing to consider solutions other than 
those that are market based and dominated by liberalization.  As a result, the UK has 
become an influential actor in energy policy making on the EU level. 
In contrast to the British case, Duffield and Westphal remind us that Germany has 
been a much more consistent champion of EU integration generally, yet when it comes to 
energy, it displays a similar ambivalence.  The areas in which it has traditionally opposed 
cooperation, however, are unique.  It has tended to back policy initiatives concerning 
climate change, renewable sources of energy, and energy conservation, but it has resisted 
a number of others, such as the creation of a common external energy policy and the 
liberalization of the gas and electricity markets, towards which Britain has been more 
supportive.  This chapter examines in detail the specific context of German energy 
policy, which has been consistently in favor of energy efficiency and renewables, and 
less so towards nuclear energy and market opening.  German polilcy has been strongly 
influenced by the interests of a small number of powerful domestic energy companies, 
which dominate the internal market and retain very close ties with Russian suppliers. As 
a result, Germany has expressed rhetorical support for the internal energy market and a 
common external energy policy, but has been much more reluctant to back its words with 
actions.  In other areas, however, Germany has backed EU measures because of strong 
societal support for renewable and action to improve energy efficiency, particularly 
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where it concerns climate change and the environment.  Despite this record of mixed 
support for a common European energy policy, the authors do see some hope for future 
progress as a result of recent political developments in Germany. 
 
D. Energy, Climate Change, and the Role of EU Institutions 
The chapters in the third section of the book operate from a more macro 
perspective, addressing the role that the EU has played in promoting climate change 
policies, particularly as a global leader in pressing for stronger reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions and sustainable energy policies leading up to the 
Copenhagen summit, and assessing the overall nature of EU institutions and policy 
making in the energy field.   Both chapters attempt to situate the developments in 
EU energy policy in terms of the cross-cutting pressures and perspectives inevitably 
associated with policy making at multiple levels of governance—the global, regional, 
and national.  Each chapter also confronts head on the challenges of policy making 
in an area where intergovernmental interests and institutional mechanisms coexist 
with supranational policy ambitions and community level competence and 
authority.     
Arno Behrens and Christian Egenhofer offer an assessment of the EU’s 
approach to combating climate change by first tracing how the European 
community will likely be impacted. They show that the consequences will in all 
probability vary considerably across regions, with Northern Europe likely to 
experience some positive effects and the Southern regions, already comparatively 
economically disadvantaged, very likely to be more negatively impacted and 
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perhaps even devastated by extreme weather patterns and rising temperatures.  
The authors provide a detailed summary of these projected impacts in order to 
contextualize more properly EU policy responses and to show that the EU is 
ultimately falling behind in constructing a more comprehensive and integrated 
approach to energy policy.  In particular, they suggest that the EU needs a clearer 
strategy on how to address more effectively increasing transport emissions not only 
from rail and automobiles, but also aviation and maritime transport.  At the global 
level, they argue that the EU needs to regain leadership and proffer options of both a 
‘soft’ approach (e.g., the UN negotiation tracks) and within a ‘hard’ one (e.g., by 
introducing carbon border taxes). 
 While the focus on the EU actions in the climate change area demonstrate 
how the EU’s rise as a global actor can help legitimize and shape its policy efforts, 
Birchfield’s chapter shows how the EU institutional and policy making landscape 
itself has propelled a new policy dynamic within which each of the three core 
institutions can be seen to be championing specific aspects of the EU’s overall 
energy policy goals.  The Parliament appears to be the strongest advocate of a more 
ambitious approach to sustainable energy and fighting climate change, while the 
Commission, also proactive in this area, nonetheless tends to take a more market 
oriented approach consistent with its original competence to pursue economic 
integration through liberalization strategies, but also pushing regulatory processes 
upwards to the EU as opposed to national levels. The Council of Ministers, of course, 
is predictably more concerned with energy security and supply questions and 
related issues that go to the heart of national sovereignty, geostrategic interests and 
 359 
independence in its foreign relations. Taken as a whole, we might then conclude that 
energy policy making at the EU level ultimately revolves around the classic push and 
pull of what the proper scope of action is for the supranational versus 
intergovernmental level, how individual member states are negotiating this 
question, and how the various EU institutions themselves are shaping the multi-
level governance and policy parameters of an emerging, albeit fragmented and 
incomplete, common energy policy. 
E. The Implications of the Lisbon Treaty and the Future Prospects for a Common 
European Energy Policy 
After years of institutional impasse and intergovernmental negotiations, the 
Treaty of Lisbon finally entered into force on 1 December 2009. Characterized as the 
new institutional foundation for a more democratic, transparent and streamlined 
European Union, the Treaty provides the EU with a new legal basis and specific 
mechanisms to tackle complex policy challenges such as energy and the environment. It 
consists of amendments to the Union's two main treaties, Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), with the latter being 
renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  As the 
Birchfield chapter highlights, the Lisbon Treaty places the European Parliament more or 
less on an equal footing with the Council of the European Union (formerly the Council of 
Ministers) in deciding the vast majority of EU laws and subjects 40 new fields to the co-
decision procedure.   Key areas of increased European Parliament (EP) power include 
energy security. The Parliament’s budgetary powers are also extended to the entirety of 
the EU budget. Although the main principles and objectives of EU environmental policy 
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remain largely unchanged, the Treaty explicitly reinforces the EU’s commitment to 
sustainable development, the fight against climate change, and development of renewable 
energy sources. 
Article 3.3 of the amended TEU states that the Union “shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment.”  (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 3.3) The change of emphasis brought by the 
amendment underlines the different dimensions of sustainable development (economic, 
social, and environmental). The same article also introduces specific reference to the 
promotion of scientific and technological progress, which could also have implications 
for environmental protection. In its relations with the wider world, the EU shall uphold 
and promote its values and contribute to the “sustainable development of the Earth.” To 
this end, the Union will work towards the adoption of “international measures to preserve 
and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global 
natural resources” (Art. 21.2 TEU).  The Treaty also introduces a single legal personality 
for the European Union, enabling it to conclude international agreements and be formally 
represented in international organizations.  Furthermore, the Treaty ensures consistency 
of EU policies on the global stage, by connecting the different strands of EU external 
action, such as diplomacy, security, trade, development, humanitarian aid and 
international negotiations. Of course, all of these legal changes must be proven through 
concrete measures and actions taken by the EU and then fully implemented at the 
national level, so only time will tell if the political will of the member states matches the 
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Treaty’s aspirations.  
Of particular relevance to the development of a common EU energy policy are 
those provisions specifically concerned with the subject.  Article 4 of the TFEU formally 
establishes energy, for the first time, as an area in which competence is shared between 
the EU and member states.  Article 194 of the TFEU goes on to elaborate four concrete 
aims for EU energy policy: 
(1) to ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(2) to ensure the security of energy supplies; 
(3) to promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new 
and renewable forms of energy; and 
(4) to promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
Measures intended to achieve these aims may be established by the Parliament and the 
Council acting under the co-decision procedure.   The Treaty nevertheless contains an 
important caveat that could significantly constrain the ability of the community 
institutions to forge a common energy policy.  It formally confirms each member state’s 
“right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply..”  How and when 
this reservation of state sovereignty is invoked will do much to shape the future course of 
EU energy policy.  At the same time, there are reasons to expect that this obstacle is not 
insuperable.  To be sure, a connecting theme of many of the chapters of this volume is 
that, while some impressive strides have been made, many obstacles stand in the way of a 
more coherent and truly common energy policy in Europe.  Nevertheless, as invoked in 
the Birchfield chapter, the father of European integration, Jean Monnet, surmised that 
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fundamental change and deeper integration would likely result not through incremental 
treaty changes or intergovernmental bargains but from profound crises and the solutions 
or responses put forward to deal with such crises,.    
It remains to be seen whether the natural gas conflicts of 2006 and 2009 or the 
growing evidence of global environmental degradation and potential devastation caused 
by climate change constitute the sort of crises that will propel the EU and its member 
states into the kind of action that will be necessary to overcome the barriers of narrow 
national interests flowing from geopolitical and domestic economic concerns as well as 
traditional foreign policy strategies in securing national energy needs.  But when Russia’s 
gas deliveries through Ukraine were interrupted and some EU member states went 
weeks without power, thus invoking calls for solidarity and Community level action, 
the EU responded.  Likewise, the global environmental crisis related to the effects of 
climate change or, for that matter, the crisis-like nature of the rapid deletion of fossil 
fuels coupled with instability and crisis in the global economic system have formed 
the backdrop for the EU’s justification to take aggressive measures in pursuing 
greater energy efficiency and renewable, alternative and ‘green’ sources of energy.  
Thus, it could be argued that these various crises do indeed constitute a political call 
to action or the foundation upon which a common EU energy policy can be forged.  
Yet, it is also well to acknowledge that even before the financial crisis of 
2008, the incipient pressures of the 2009 UN conference on climate change, and the 
most recent Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, the EU had acted in an ambitious and 
progressive way in first articulating the 2006 Green Paper, adopting a 
comprehensive Action Plan in 2007, and then developing a detailed climate and 
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energy package in 2008, Even with its noted limitations, this approach seemed 
positioned only to expand and deepen.  Many factors, ranging from the internal (e.g., 
member states’ varying energy mixes, different economic structures, public 
attitudes) to the external (e.g., regional and global energy markets, relations with 
suppliers and transit countries) will shape the ways in which EU member states and 
EU institutions work in concert to establish policies that will be more effective, 
efficient and sustainable.  Thus, the prospects for a future common energy policy 
within the EU will depend on both the degree to which energy issues in the 21st 
century are marked by crises and the institutional and economic logic of operating 
within a complex policy landscape (supranational, intergovernmental, and multi-
level) that itself reflects the interdependencies of a policy area like that of energy 
and the environment.  
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